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Abstract : This paper extends previous research (Pufahl and Weiss, 2009) and applies a 
semi-parametric propensity score matching approach to evaluate the effects of agri-
environment (AE) programs on input use and farm output of individual farms in eight 
Member States of the European Union. We find substantial differences in treatment 
effects between countries. The analysis reveals significant effects of AE participation on 
production (Germany, France) and farm profits (France, Ireland, United Kingdom). AE 
participation sporadically reduces the intensity of land use as measured by the purchase of 
farm chemicals (fertilizer, pesticide) and grazing livestock densities. We also find 
differences in the treatment effect among farms with different farm size (heterogeneous 
treatment effects). 
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Farm Structure and the Effects of Agri-Environmental Programs:  




Evaluating the effects of farm programs on farm output is a key policy issue. This determines 
whether programs are condemned as trade distorting or can be classified as ‘decoupled’ and 
conform  with  WTO  regulations.  Further,  changes  in  the  focus  of  EU  agricultural  policy 
(towards more environmental types of support, for example) will have implications for farm 
structure  and  structural  change.  Depending  (among  other  things)  on  the  participation 
decisions of individual farmers, the impact of farm programs will differ between regions and 
individual Member States. 
 
An  empirical  evaluation  of  the  effects  of  farm  programs  however  faces  a  number  of 
challenges:  First,  farms  self-select  into  program  participation  and  participants  and  non-
participants  thus  differ  significantly  in  important  characteristics  (selection  bias).  Second, 
factors that determine the selection into the program and/or influence outcome variables may 
not  fully  be  observed  (unobserved  heterogeneity).  Further  it  remains  unknown  how 
participants  would  have  performed  if  they  had  not  participated  in  the  program  as 
counterfactuals cannot be observed in non-experimental studies. Finally, the optimal response 
to governmental programs will not be homogenous across individual farms (heterogeneity in 
response).  
 
The  present  paper  addresses  these  issues  by  applying  a  non-parametric  propensity  score 
matching  approach  in  combination  with  a  difference-in-difference  estimator.
2  The  key 
advantage of matching (over standard regression methods) is that it is less demanding with 
respect  to  the  modelling  assumptions.  Further,  with  matching,  there  is  no  need  for  the 
assumption of constant additive treatment effects across individuals. Instead, the individual 
causal  effects  are  unrestricted  and  individual  effect  heterogeneity  in  the  population  is 
permitted. Specifically, we aim at investigating the effects of agri-environment programs (AE 
programs)  with  respect  to  farm  size  (area  under  cultivation),  farm  output  (sales),  labour 
supply  (on-  and  off-farm),  productivity  (sales  per  hectare),  purchase  of  farm  chemicals 
(pesticides,  fertilizers)  and  livestock  densities  for  the  period  2000  to  2005.  We  extend 
previous  research  (Pufahl  and  Weiss,  2009)  by  using  FADN  data  for  farms  in  Germany, 
Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom. To evaluate 
and compare the effects of AE programs between EU Member States, the propensity score 
analysis will be carried out separately for each of the above mentioned countries. In addition, 
we investigate heterogeneous treatment effects within Member States.  
 
The following Section 2 briefly describes AE programs and their implementation in EU-15. 
The estimation method and the data used are outlined in Section 3. Section 4 presents the 
empirical  results  along  with  a  number  of  extensions  and  robustness  checks  considering 
statistical methods and data reliability. Section 5 draws some conclusions.  
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   According to our knowledge, the first applications of these methods for individual farms are Lynch 
et al. (2007) and Pufahl and Weiss (2009).   2 
2. AGRI-ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMS IN THE EU-15 
Total expenditures of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reached 54.6 billion Euro in 
2006. Direct payments and price policies account for the largest share (78 per cent) of CAP 
expenditures, a minor but increasing part of the CAP budget (22 per cent) is allocated to rural 
development policies (EU Commission, 2006). Among them, AE programs account for 37 per 
cent of EU rural development expenditures (Agrar CEAS Consulting, 2005). These figures 
illustrate that AE programs became a core instrument of the rural development policies within 
the EU and are no longer of marginal importance within the CAP framework. 
 
The  EU’s  AE  programs  were  introduced  as  ‘Accompanying  Measures’  of  the  1992  Mac 
Sharry Reform of the CAP. Since the 2000 CAP reform (EC Regulation No. 1257/1999), AE 
programs are categorized as ‘second pillar’ policies. Farmers receive compensation payments 
for  the  adoption  of  environmentally  friendly  production  technologies.  Agri-environment 
payments are calculated on an acreage base and are meant to cover the income foregone plus 
additional costs for compliance. Participation in AE programs is voluntary, restricted to farm 
enterprises and usually bound to renewable five year contracts. Program participation requires 
farm  enterprises to meet pre-defined eligibility  criteria that  go beyond  the level of ‘good 
farming practise’. With few exceptions, program eligibility does not depend on the actual 
change  of  management  practices.  This  enables  farms  that  already  comply  with  program 
eligibility criteria to enter AE programs. 
 
The type of AE programs (AE schemes) offered and their acceptance among farmers varies 
significantly between EU member states as well as between different regions within member 
states. While more than eighty per cent of the total agricultural area is covered by at least one 
AE program in Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Luxemburg, the average share is around 26 per 
cent in the EU-15 (see Table 1). The varying share of AE programs in the EU-15 reflects the 
political relevance placed upon them, the financial capability of the Member States, as well as 
their  opportunity  costs  of  the  adoption  of  AE  programs  (Glebe  and  Salhofer,  2007).  The 
importance  of  AE  programs  tends  to  be  high  in  countries  with  less  favourable  natural 
conditions for agricultural production and small scale farming structures as encountered in 
Scandinavia and Austria. On the contrary, AE programs are of minor importance in Denmark, 
The  Netherlands  and  Belgium,  where  agriculture  is  dominated  by  large  scale  intensive 
livestock, milk and arable production. 
 
The EU budget allotted to AE programs was 2.012 million Euros in 2003. The total spending 
on AE programs was about twice as much, as Member States co-finance EU expenditures 
with up to 50 %. The average EU expenditure per hectare farmland enrolled in AE programs 
is 60 Euro and 120 Euro when doubled by national co-finance (EEA, 2005). Theoretically, we 
should  expect  high  AE  payments  in  Member  States  with  high  opportunity  costs  of  AE 
participation (e. g. The Netherlands) and/or high social benefits of AE programs (e. g. Austria 
and Ireland). Given the large variability of available AE schemes, natural conditions within 
Member States and the varying political power of the farming lobby in the Member States, 
country-specific  observed  AE  payments  per  hectare  do  not  always  meet  these  theoretical 
expectations. In the empirical analysis, country-specific effects and natural conditions can be 
controlled to some extent, but we can not distinguish among different AE schemes. Organic 
farms  are  identified  by  a  specific  code  but  are  too  few  in  numbers  to  permit  a  separate 
analysis.   3 




Share of farmland under 
AE programs (2002) 
EU expenditures to AE programs 
(2003)/contracted farmland (2002) 
   per cent  Euro/ha 
     
GRE  3.2  60.9 
NED  3.2  140.5 
ESP  8.9  54.1 
DEN  11.1  62.0 
BEL  11.7  83.8 
UK  16.0  26.3 
ITA  17.2  149.9 
POR  17.5  99.5 
GER  24.5  91.8 
IRE  28.1  105.1 
FRA  30.7  26.6 
AUT  82.3  111.7 
SWE  87.9  51.8 
FIN  98.5  75.9 
LUX  100.4  45.9 
EU-15  26.4  60.2 
Source: EEA (2005). 
 
Predominant  objectives  of  AE  programs  are  the  reduction  of  inputs  (40  per  cent  of  the 
supported area in the EU-15) and the maintenance of cultural landscapes (30 per cent of the 
supported area) (EEA, 2005). The choice of variables analysed in the present paper reflects 
AE objectives related to land use (area under cultivation, grassland), input reduction (cattle 
livestock density, pesticides and fertilizer purchase) and the maintenance of labour intensive 
traditional farm practices (on-farm labour). Of further interest is, whether AE programs have 




3. ESTIMATION METHOD AND DATA  
Matching  is  a  widely-used  non-experimental  method  of  evaluation  that  can  be  used  to 
estimate the average effect of a particular program.
3 This method compares the outcomes of 
program participants with those of matched non-participants, where matches are chosen on 
the basis of similarity in observed characteristics. Suppose there are two groups of farmers 
distinguished  by  participation  status  P  =  0/1,  where  1  (0)  indicates  farms  that  did  (not) 
participate in a program. Denote by 
1 Y  the outcome conditional on participation (P = 1) and 
by 
0 Y  the outcome conditional on non-participation (P = 0).  
 
The most common evaluation parameter of interest is the ‘average treatment effect on the 
treated’  (ATT)  defined  as  ( ) [ ] [ ] 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 = - = = = - = P Y E P Y E P Y Y E ATT ,  which 
answers the following question: ‘How much did farms participating in the program benefit 
compared to what they would have experienced without participating in the program?’ Data 
on  ) 1 (
1 = P Y E  are available from the program participants. An evaluator’s ‘classic problem’ 
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   A  detailed discussion  of  the  matching  approach  as  well  as  a  survey  on its  applications in  labour-
market evaluation studies is available in Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008).    4 
is to find  ) 1 (
0 = P Y E , since data on non-participants enables one to identify  ) 0 (
0 = P Y E  
only. So the difference between  ) 1 (
1 = P Y E  and  ) 1 (
0 = P Y E  cannot be observed for the 
same farm. 
 
The  solution  advanced  by  Rubin  (1977)  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  given  a  set  of 
observable  covariates  X,  potential  (non-treatment)  outcomes  are  independent  of  the 
participation status (conditional independence assumption-CIA):  X P Y ^
0 . Hence, after 
adjusting for observable differences, the mean of the potential outcome is the same for P = 1 
and P = 0 ( ) , 0 ( ) , 1 (
0 0 X X = = = P Y E P Y E ). 
 
To  improve  the  results  of  this  estimator,  Heckman  et  al.  (1997)  suggest  a  conditional 
difference-in-difference  matching  estimator (d-i-d).  Let t represent a time period  after the 
program start date and t’ a time period before the program. The conditional d-i-d estimator 
compares the conditional before-after outcomes of program participants with those of non-





1 = - - = - P Y Y E P Y Y E t t t t .  
 
Instead  of  conditioning  on  X,  Rosenbaum  and  Rubin  (1983)  suggest  conditioning  on  a 
propensity  score  (‘propensity  score  matching’).  The  propensity  score  is  defined  as  the 
probability  of  participation  for  farm  i  given  a  set  i x X =   of  farm  characteristics 
( ) ( ) i x X X = = º 1 Pr P p .  The  propensity  scores  are  derived  from  a  logit  model  were 
participation in the AE program serves as the endogenous variable. The estimated propensity 
scores are then used to construct the comparison groups.  
 
The empirical analysis is based on a balanced FADN panel from eight EU Member States 
(Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal and United Kingdom) for 
which continuous records are available for the period 2001 to 2004. The analysed sample 
comprises 16,337 farms, which represent 1.8 million farm enterprises in the selected Member 
States. In the empirical analysis we weight each farm equally because farm-specific weights 
would not make the sample representative with respect to AE participation. FADN provides 
information on farm characteristics (area under cultivation, sales, on- and off farm labour, 
capital endowment and purchase for farm chemicals ...) and also includes information on the 
participation  in  AE  programs.  To  evaluate  the  effect  of  program  participation  with  the 
conditional d-i-d estimator, we focus only on those farms which did not participate in the 
program in the initial time period (2001). The selection of data and the definition of program 
participation are described in Table 2 (for additional information on variable definitions and 
data sources see Table A1 in the appendix). 
 
The basis for the empirical analysis (propensity score difference-in-difference matching) of 
AE programs are those 11,581 farms that did not participate in AE programs in the base year 
2001. Participation is defined as receiving a positive amount of program payments. From 
those farms, 1,150 farms (9.9 per cent) participated in AE programs from 2002 or 2003 until 
2004 (the dummy variable PAE is set equal to one). The dummy variable is set equal to zero 
for the 8,854 farms (80.4 per cent) which never participate in AE programs between 2001 and   5 
2004. Note that 1,577 farms (9.7 per cent) participate in some years only. These farms will 
not be used for the empirical analysis.
4  
 
Table 2. Sample Selection Criteria and Program Participation 
 
  All  GER  ESP  FRA  IRE  ITA  NED  POR  UK 
Total number of farms with records from 
2001 to 2004*  16,337  4,063  3,785  4,071  873  679  633  817  1,416 
Program participation in base year (2001)  4,756  2,528  170  913  255  266  144  150  330 
Non-participation in base year (2001)   11,581  1,535  3,615  3,158  618  413  489  667  1,086 
Program participation starts in 2002 
or 2003 until 2004: 
 
Dummy variable (PAE) is set equal to 
1 for farms which participate in agri-
environment programs from 2002 or 
2003 until 2004 (for two or three 
years) 
1,150  304  74  438  55  26  23  140  90 
Program participation in 2003 or 2004 
only (these farms are excluded from 
the empirical analysis):  
 
1,577  544  244  377  33  59  43  104  173 
Continuous non-participation (2001 – 
2004):  
 
Dummy variable (PAE) is set equal to 
0 for farms which never participated 
in agri-environment programs 
between 2001 and 2004 
8,854  687  3,297  2,343  530  328  423  423  823 
Notes: * Excluding farms of the farm type ‘Horticulture’, ‘Wine’ and ‘Other permanent crops’. 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Propensity Scores and Matching 
Conditional probabilities for participation in AE programs are computed by estimating a logit 
model. Table A2 in the appendix reports the parameter estimates for the model, the results are 
only briefly discussed here. The estimated model is statistically significant at the 1 per cent 
level or better, as measured by the likelihood ratio test. The empirical model for AE programs 
correctly classifies 88.74 per cent of all observations, but only 0.57 per cent of participants. 
From the parameter estimates of the logit model, the bounded propensity scores are calculated 
for every farm which are then used for the matching analysis. The results when using the 
unbounded propensity scores are very similar.  
 
The parameters included in the logit model mainly comprise pre-treatment outcomes in the 
reference  year  2001.  Since  the  decision  of  program  participation  is  closely  related  to  the 
objective of AE programs, these pre-treatment outcomes are important factors explaining the 
decision to participate in AE programs. Assuming a  profit-maximising behaviour of farm 
enterprises,  fixed  AE  payments  per  hectare  and  the  predominance  of  input  reducing  AE 
schemes,  farms  with  relatively  low  land  use  intensity  (fertiliser  expenditures,  grazing 
                                                 
4
   An interesting extension of the present analysis would be to consider treatment effects in a dynamic 
framework.  Lechner  (2006)  addresses  some  practical  issues  that  come  with  the  non-  or  semi-
parametric estimation of models with sequential interventions.    6 
livestock  density)  and  unfavourable  natural  conditions  (altitude  zone)  are  most  likely  to 
participate to AE programs. The respective coefficients show the expected signs (Table A2). 
Member  State  differences  between  AE  programs  and  factors  influencing  program 
participation (agricultural structure, management types) are captured by respective dummy 
variables. 
 
Matching  is  considered  successful  when  significant  differences  of  covariates  among 
participants and non-participants are removed. Table 3 reports unadjusted and adjusted means 




Table 3. Unadjusted  and  adjusted  means  of  selected  variables  (frequencies  for  dummy 
variables) in the pre-treatment year 2001, all countries 
 










Farm sales  11.310  11.096 *  11.307  11.295 
Farm sales (per ha)  7.153  7.266 *  7.166  7.165 
Area under cultivation  4.160  3.835 *  4.143  4.152 
Permanent pasture  2.051  1.471 *  2.028  2.041 
Rented land  3.213  2.355 *  3.187  3.179 
On-farm labour  8.264  8.099 *  8.242  8.248 
On-farm labour (per 100 ha)  -0.501  -0.341 *  -0.506  -0.509 
Farm net value added  67,529  48,684 *  59,843  58,211 
Farm capital (per ha)  7.994  8.053 *  7.997  7.996 
Grazing livestock units  3.078  2.322 *  3.046  3.085 
Grazing livestock density  0.232  0.284 *  0.236  0.228 
Pesticide expenditures (per ha)  3.115  2.945 *  3.141  3.141 
Fertilizer expenditures (per ha)  3.981  4.120 *  4.029  4.007 
Dummy variable ‘Arable farm’  346  3,916  *  340  347 
Dummy variable ‘Dairy farm’  254  2092    252  253 
Dummy variable ‘Livestock farm’  264  1410  *  250  240 
Dummy variable ‘Pig & poultry farm’  22  266  *  22  21 
Dummy variable ‘Mixed farm’  264  1,170  *  255  358 
Dummy variable ‘Germany’  304  687  *  288  300 
Dummy variable ‘Spain’  74  3,243  *  74  78 
Dummy variable ‘France’  438  2,343  *  434  422 
Dummy variable ‘Ireland’  55  530    55  60 
Dummy variable ‘Italy’  26  328  *  26  22 
Dummy variable ‘Portugal’  140  423  *  129  129 
Dummy variable ‘United Kingdom’  90  823    90  76 
Dummy variable ‘The Netherlands’  23  423  *  23  32 
Number of observations  1,150  8,854    1,119  1,119 
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviations see Table A1. * indicate significantly different means between 
observations from the potential (selected) treatment group and from the potential (selected) control group in a ttest 
for equality of means at the 5 per cent level.  
 
Prior to the matching analysis, farms participating in AE programs significantly differ from 
non-participants with respect to nearly all characteristics shown in Table 3. A comparison 
between column (1) and (2) indicates that farms enrolled in AE programs are characterized by 
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  Additional  test  statistics  for  these  variables  (such  as  the  ‘standardized  bias’  (Baser,  2006))  are 
available from the authors upon request.   7 
a  larger  area  under  cultivation  and  a  higher  on-farm  labour  input,  for  example.  These 
differences  in  farm  characteristics  between  program  participants  and  non-participants  are 
significantly different from zero.  
 
Columns (3) and (4) report the adjusted means of the selected variables for the treatment and 
control  group  after the  matching procedure has been applied.  From the 1,150  farms  with 
participation in AE programs, 1,119 were matched to farms with no participation but similar 
propensity scores. The differences between treatments and controls are now much smaller and 
in no case significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level. We can thus conclude that 
all  observable  differences  in  means  between  treatments  and  controls  have  been  removed 
through matching in the initial period 2001 (before program participation). 
 
4.2 Treatment Effects 
The average effect of the participation in AE programs is estimated by comparing the changes 











0 Y Y Y - = D )  between  2001  and  2004  (d-i-d  analysis).  The  impact  of 
treatment on the treated (‘causal effect’ of program participation) is estimated by computing 























ATT , where N1 is the number of matches. 
 
A positive (negative) value of ATT suggests that farms with participation in AE programs 
have  higher  (lower)  growth  rates  of  outcome  variable  Y  than  non-participants.  Table  4 
displays the growth rates (log differences) of outcome variables for the treatment and control 
group as well as the difference between both (the ATT). 
 
Table 4.  Average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for AE programs from 2001 to 2004 
(in log differences), all countries 
Outcome  Treatments  Controls  ATT  Std. Error  t-value 
  [1]  [2]  = [1] - [2]    (Significance) 
Farm sales  0.028  0.057  -0.029  0.031  -0.96   
Farm sales (per ha)  -0.029  0.021  -0.050  0.024  -2.12  (**) 
Area under cultivation  0.058  0.023  0.035  0.011  3.37  (***) 
Permanent pasture  0.007  -0.041  0.048  0.028  1.67  (*) 
Rented land  0.073  -0.011  0.084  0.026  3.25  (***) 
On-farm labour  -0.121  -0.156  0.035  0.012  2.81  (***) 
On-farm labour (per 100 ha)  -0.179  -0.179  0.000  0.016  -0.06   
Farm net value added  4,024  2,982  1,041  1,705  0.61   
Farm capital (per ha)  0.001  -0.027  0.028  0.015  1.87  (*) 
Grazing livestock units  -0.045  -0.067  0.022  0.020  1.08   
Grazing livestock density  -0.041  -0.021  -0.020  0.019  -1.03   
Pesticide expenditures (per ha)  0.001  0.016  -0.015  0.035  -0.45   
Fertilizer expenditures (per ha)  -0.066  -0.008  -0.058  0.034  -1.71  (*) 
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviations see Table A1. Asterisks denote statistical significance in a t-test 
for equality of means at 1 per cent (***), 5 per cent (**) or 10 per cent (*) level. Log differences are reported for 
all variables. Results are based on a Greedy algorithm with calliper pair matching without replacement.    8 
Results of the d-i-d estimator suggest a positive and significant causal impact of program 
participation on the area under cultivation. Between 2001 until 2004 farms with participation 
to AE programs increased their area of cultivation by 5.8 per cent, while non-participants 
report a positive growth rate of 2.3 per cent on average. The difference (ATT = 3.5 per cent) 
is different from zero at the 1 per cent level of significance.  
 
The positive effect of  AE programs on the area under  cultivation confirms the results of 
Osterburg (2004) and Pufahl and Weiss (2009) for Germany. Higher farm land growth rates 
of program participants  can be  explained by acreage  related  AE payments and the adjust 
process  of  farms  induced  by  program  eligibility  criteria.  The  increase  of  the  area  under 
cultivation seems to be a strategy to maintain farm income under AE programs: Economic 
farm growth is realised by increasing the area under cultivation instead of increasing the land 
use intensity per hectare. Farm growth is mainly achieved by renting in additional land. The 
area of rented land increases for the treatment group (+7.3 per cent) and decreases in the 
control group (-1.1 per cent). The ATT with 8.4 per cent is significantly different from zero.  
 
While there is a highly significant increase in the area under cultivation, the effect of AE 
programs on the reduction of inputs is less clear cut: During the period of analysis, program 
participants reduced fertilizer expenditures per hectare by 6.6 per cent, while non-participants 
show  a  slight  decrease  of  0.8 per  cent.  The  ATT  of  -6.8 per  cent  indicates  that  farms 
participating in AE significantly reduced the purchase of farm chemicals compared to the 
control group but is significant at the 10 per cent level only. No significant effects of AE 
programs are observed with respect to the reduction of pesticide expenditures per hectare and 
the grazing livestock densities. This might be explained by the lack of AE scheme focusing on 
the reduction of pesticide use (mainly relevant in cash crop and permanent crop production) 
and livestock densities.  
 
Table 4 further suggest a significant, negative productivity effect of AE programs: Farms 
sales per hectare decrease in participating farms (-2.9 per cent) and increase in farms with 
non-participation (2.1 per cent). The ATT of -5.0 per cent is significant at the 5 per cent level. 
This result contradicts findings of Salhofer and Streicher (2005) and Pufahl and Weiss (2009), 
who observe an insignificant productivity effect of AE programs in Austria and Germany, 
respectively. The effect of AE programs on total farm sales is insignificant. 
 
Farm-household models suggest a positive effect of coupled payments on on-farm labour (El-
Osta  et  al.,  2004).  Government  payments  contribute  to  farm  income  and  enhance  the 
remuneration of farm factors used. Shaik and Helmers (2006), Lambert and Griffin (2004) 
and Pufahl and Weiss (2009) provide empirical evidence for a positive effect of government 
payments on on-farm labour, while the effect was insignificant in the study of El-Osta et al. 
(2004). The results in Table 4 support the idea that adjustments with respect to farm labour 
are slowed down under AE participation. AE participants show a decreasing on-farm labour 
endowment  (-12.1 per  cent),  which  is  exceeded  by  an  even  steeper  decrease  in  non-
participating farms (-15.6 per cent). The respective ATT of +3.5 % is significant different 
from zero at the one per cent level and suggests a positive effect of AE programs on on-farm 
labour.  
 
Although farm land growth rates of AE programme participants are about double of those of 
non-participants, AE participants maintain a constant capital endowment per hectare. On the 
contrary, non-participants show a substantial decrease in farm capital per hectare. The ATT 
with respect to farm capital per hectare is 2.8 per cent. This might suggest that AE program   9 
payments enhance farm liquidity (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2006) and are not used for non-farm 
purposes. No significant treatment effect of AE programs is observed with respect to farm 
profit (farm net value added). 
 
An important objective of AE policies in the EU-15 is the maintenance of permanent pastures. 
We find that AE support resulted in an increase of permanent pastures in farms with program 
participation.  The  size of  permanent  pastures  remains  stable  in  farms  participating  in  AE 
programs (+0.7 per cent) while it decreases in those with non-participation (-4.1 per cent). 
The ATT of 4.8 per cent is significantly different from zero at the 10 per cent level only. The 
extra permanent pastures in farms with AE participation might come from exiting, shrinking 
and/or  intensifying  farms.  Unfortunately,  more  detailed  (plot  specific)  information  on  the 
adjustment of land allocation as a consequence of AE programs is not available. 
 
4.3 Heterogeneity of Effects and Robustness of Results 
The  effect  of  AE  programs  will  differ  between  individual  observations  (heterogeneity  of 
treatment  effects)  for  various  reasons:  First,  there  is  a  wide  variability  of  AE  schemes 
available in EU Member States.
6 Second, the magnitude of treatment effects might depend on 
certain farm characteristics of which the farm size is of special interest here.  
 
To  extend  the  empirical  analysis  along  the  two  lines,  we  carry  out  additional  estimation 
experiments: (a) The heterogeneity of the effects of AE programs across Member States is 
analysed by stratifying the sample and performing separate analyses for each country. (b) 
Whether the effect of AE programs differs between farms with different farm size is estimated 
by using parametric regressions.  
 
The  causal  effects  of  AE  programs  in  different  Member  States  are  shown  in  Table  5. 
Estimates for countries with a small number of observations (Italy, The Netherlands) however 
turn out not to be significantly different from zero. Results in Table 5 suggest a positive and 
significant causal impact of program participation on farm sales in Germany and France. The 
growth rate of farm sales of participants exceeded those of non-participants by 4.9 per cent 
(Germany) and 3.8 per cent (France), respectively. Both effects are significant on the 5 per 
cent  level.  These  results  confirm  those  of  Pufahl  and  Weiss  (2009)  for  Germany.  The 
significant increase in farm sales is paralleled  by  a significant increase in the area under 
cultivation.  The  respective  ATT  is  significant  in  Germany  (+3.8 per  cent)  and  France 
(+2.3 per cent).  
 
The positive effect of AE programs on the area under cultivation seems to be common in all 
countries and is often paralleled by a positive effect on-farm labour input (although the effects 
are statistically significant in some countries only). Significant effects of AE programs on the 
reduction  of  land  use  intensity  (grazing  livestock  density,  pesticides  and  fertilizer 
expenditures per hectare) are evident for Germany, Spain and France. If farm land growth is 
not followed by a substantial decrease of the land use intensity, the overall production effect 
of AE programs will be positive. 
 
                                                 
6
   The data do not allow to distinguish among different AE schemes within or between EU Member 
States,  nor  are  there  information  about  the  area  enrolled  into  AE  programs  or  the  AE  premia  per 
hectare.    10 
Table 5.   Average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for AE programs from 2001 to 2004 (in log differences) by country 
Outcome  GER    ESP    FRA    IRE    ITA    NED    POR    UK   
  ATT (Sign.)  ATT (Sign.)  ATT (Sign.)  ATT (Sign.)  ATT (Sign.)  ATT (Sign.)  ATT (Sign.)  ATT (Sign.) 
Farm sales  0.049 (**)  -0.186   0.038 (**)  -0.171   0.103   0.136   -0.029   0.014   
Farm sales (per ha)  0.011   -0.333 (*)  0.017   -0.141   0.035   0.019   -0.087   -0.019   
Area under cultivation  0.038 (***)  0.171   0.023 (**)  0.049   0.068   0.118   0.058   0.033   
Permanent pasture  0.067   0.265 (*)  0.065   0.134   -0.208   -0.108   0.050   -0.084   
Rented land  0.131 (**)  0.270 (*)  0.033 (**)  0.149 (*)  0.346   0.014   0.009   0.097   
On-farm labour  0.032   0.102 (**)  0.077 (***)  0.018   -0.040   0.150   0.031   0.034   
On-farm labour (per 100 ha)  -0.007   -0.070   0.054 (***)  -0.032   -0.108   0.032   -0.027   0.001   
Farm net value added  2,996   -3,452   6,601 (***)  5,805 (***)  -7,226   20,855   -159   9,534 (*) 
Farm capital (per ha)  0.031   -0.011   0.037 (**)  -0.036   0.101   -0.005   0.019   -0.053   
Grazing livestock units  0.081 (*)  -0.021   0.031   0.021    0.107   0.143   0.031   -0.073   
Grazing livestock density  0.027   -0.208 (*)  -0.042 (*)  -0.035    0.058   0.051   0.029   -0.065   
Pesticide expenditures (per ha)  0.132 (**)  0.041   -0.091 (**)  -0.340    -0.310    0.218    0.126    -0.136   
Fertilizer expenditures (per ha)  -0.139 (**)  -0.380 (**)  0.032    -0.206    -0.148    -0.522    0.061    0.004   
Number of treatments/controls     280/280  74/74    422/422  54/54    25/25    20/20    106/106  88/88   
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviations see Table A1. Asterisks denote statistical significance in a t-test for equality of means at 1 per cent (***), 5 per cent (**) or 
10 per cent (*) level. Log differrences are reported for all variables. Results are based on a Greedy algorithm with calliper pair matching without replacement.  
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Table 6.   Parameter estimates of linear regression models of farm size (area under cultivation) on the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT) for AE programs from 2001 to 2004 by country and outcome variable 
Outcome  ESP    FRA    IRE    ITA    NED    POR    UK   
  ATT  (Sign.)  ATT  (Sign.)  ATT  (Sign.)  ATT  (Sign.)  ATT  (Sign.)  ATT  (Sign.)  ATT  (Sign.) 
Farm sales  0.236    0.006    -0.556  (*)  -0.350  (*)  0.133    0.085    0.023   
Farm sales (per ha)  0.339    0.115  (**)  -0.242    -0.136    0.11    0.090    0.053   
Area under cultivation  -0.113    -0.109  (***)  -0.204  (***)  -0.214  (**)  0.023    0.000    -0.031   
Permanent pasture  -0.323    -0.197  (*)  -0.197    -1.186  (***)  -0.187    0.078    -0.115   
Rented land  -0.019    -0.089  (*)  0.089    -0.170    -0.362  (**)  -0.188    0.265   
On-farm labour  -0.014    0.087  (**)  0.029    -0.142    -0.089    0.050    0.079   
On-farm labour (per 100 ha)  0.099    0.196  (***)  0.233  (**)  0.072    -0.112    0.050    0.11   
Farm net value added  7.308    5.448    -894    7.180    12.077    4.272  (*)  3.062   
Farm capital  -0.090    0.070  (*)  0.115    0.251    0.074    0.077    0.105   
Grazing livestock units  -0.029    -0.060    -0.066    0.278    -0.283    0.080    0.014   
Grazing livestock density  0.215    0.110  (**)  0.116    0.111    -0.126    0.039    0.111   
Pesticide expenditures (per ha)  -0.167    0.196  (**)  -0.081    -0.101    0.607    0.216    -0.400   
Fertilizer expenditures (per ha)  0.002    0.084    -0.418    -0.417    1.664  (*)  -0.008    -0.021   
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviations see Table A1. Control variables in each regression model include: farm size of participants, farm size of non-participants, 
dummy variables for the type of farming and dummy variables for Nuts 3 regions. Asterisks denote statistical significance in a t-test for equality of means at 1 per cent (***), 
5 per cent (**) or 10 per cent (*) level. No estimates are computed for Germany, because the farm size of selected treatments is significantly higher as the farm size of non-
selected treatments that are off common support. The estimated effect of farm size on the ATT would be biased.   12 
For three countries, we observe a significant and positive income effect of AE programs. The 
annual farm net value added of AE participants is about 6,601 Euro (France), 5,805 Euro 
(Ireland) and 9,534 Euro (United Kingdom) higher then those of the control group. 
 
The regression estimates in Table 6 reflect the influence of farm size (area under cultivation) 
on country-specific effects of AE programs (the ATT). The results support the idea that the 
magnitude of treatment effects is influenced by farm size. In the case of France and Ireland, 
for example, the ATT with respect to the area under cultivation is negatively correlated with 
farm size, suggesting that smaller farms growth faster under AE program participation than 
larger farms. A positive correlation is observed between the ATT with respect to on-farm 
labour per 100 hectare and farm size: The positive effect of AE programs on labour input per 
100 hectare is highest in large farms.  
 
To assess the robustness of our results, we carried out a number of additional country-specific 
estimation experiments with different matching estimators. Specifically, we tested calliper 
matching with replacement (1:1, 1:5) and kernel matching. Matching with replacement and 
kernel matching did remove the observed differences of covariates among participants and 




5. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
The present paper uses a semi-parametric propensity score matching estimator combined with 
a difference-in-difference approach to evaluate agri-environment (AE) programs with respect 
to their effects on farm size (area under cultivation), labour supply, farm output (sales), farm 
profits  (farm  net  value  added),  productivity  (sales  per  hectare),  expenditures  for  farm 
chemicals  (pesticides,  fertilizers),  and  livestock  densities.  The  analysis  is  carried  out  for 
Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal and United Kingdom. 
 
We observe a significant positive effect of the AE program on the area under cultivation. This 
complies  with  findings  of  earlier  studies  (Key  et  al.,  2005;  Osterburg,  2004;  Shaik  and 
Helmers,  2006;  Pufahl  and  Weiss,  2009).  Higher  farm  land  growth  rates  of  program 
participants can be explained by acreage related AE program payments and the adjust process 
of farms induced by program eligibility criteria. The increase of the area under cultivation 
seems to be a strategy to maintain farm income under AE programs: farm growth is realised 
by  increasing  the  area  under  cultivation  instead  of  increasing  the  land  use  intensity  per 
hectare. This hypothesis is supported by a decrease of fertilizer purchase per hectare and farm 
sales per hectare under AE programs. 
 
Results of the country specific analysis reveal significant differences in the effects of AE 
programs  on  input  reduction,  production  and  farm  income  across  Member  States.  AE 
programs  in  Germany  and  France  significantly  increase  farm  sales,  suggesting  a  positive 
production  effect  of  AE  programs.  The  increase  in  farm  sales  in  Germany  and  France  is 
parallel by an increase in the area under cultivation. If the expansion of farm land is not 
followed by a substantial decrease of the land use intensity, the overall production effect of 
AE programs will be positive. In various countries, on-farm labour supply increases under AE 
programs. This may suggest that AE programs help to maintain ‘desirable’ labour-intensive 
traditional  farming  practices  (e. g.  maintaining  hedgerows  and  stone  walls).  Further,  we 
observe positive income effects (farm net value added) of AE programs for France, Ireland 
and United Kingdom.   13 
The  country-specific  propensity  score  matching  analysis  also  reveals  differences  in  the 
treatment  effects  among  farms  of  different  farm  sizes  (heterogeneous  treatment  effects), 
suggesting that AE programs are not scale neutral. Smaller farms seem to growth faster under 
AE program participation than larger farms, for example. Heterogeneous treatment effects 
have not yet been addressed in greater detail in empirical evaluation studies. This remains an 
important  area  to  be  explored  in  future  research,  since  distributional  issues  (i. e.  the 
distribution of the impacts of farm programs among different farm households) are intensively 
debated in agricultural policy. 
 
The present analysis also underlines some difficulties in empirically evaluating the effects of 
farm  programs.  First,  the  specific  form  and  implementation  of  the  programs  differ 
substantially between the countries analysed. The treatment effects obtained on the basis of a 
cross-country analysis thus have to be interpreted very carefully and a more detailed country-
specific evaluation of program effects seems warranted. This brings us to the second difficulty 
of  the  present  study.  A  precondition  for  the  application  of  matching  procedures  is  the 
availability of a large number of observations. „Propensity score matching is ‚data hungry’ 
not only in terms of the number of variables required to estimate participation and outcomes, 
but also in the number of participants and non-participants entering the matching process“ 
(Bryson, Dorsett und Purdon, 2002, S. 14). Unfortunately, the small number of observations 
available for some countries reduces the reliability of the treatment effects reported.   14 
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Appendix 
Table A1.  Variable definition and data sources 
Variable  Definition  Unit 
     
Farm sales  log Farm sales  ha 
Farm sales (per ha)  log Farm sales (per ha)  ha 
Area under cultivation  log Area under cultivation  ha 
Permanent pasture  log Permanent pasture incl. rough grazing  ha 
Rented land  log Rented land  ha 
On-farm labour  log On-farm labour  Hours/year 
On-farm labour (per 100 ha)  log On-farm labour (per 100 ha)  Hours/year 
Farm net value added  Farm net value added  1000 Euro 
Farm capital (per ha)  log Farm capital (per ha)  Euro 
Grazing livestock units  log Grazing livestock units  LSU 
Grazing livestock density  log Grazing livestock per forage area  LSU 
Pesticide expenditures (per ha)  log Pesticide expenditures (per ha)  Euro 
Fertilizer expenditures (per ha)  log Fertilizer expenditures (per ha)  Euro 
Total subsidies  log Total subsidies excluding on interest  Euro 
Altitude zone  Altitude zone  4 zones 
     
Dummy variables     
‘Arable farm’  Type of farming: Fieldcrops  0=no, 1=yes 
‘Dairy farm’  Type of farming: Milk  0=no, 1=yes 
‘Livestock farm’  Type of farming: Other grazing livestock  0=no, 1=yes 
‘Pig & poultry farm’  Type of farming: Granivores  0=no, 1=yes 
‘Mixed farm’  Type of farming: Mixed  0=no, 1=yes 
‘Germany’  Germany (GER)  0=no, 1=yes 
‘Spain’  Spain (ESP)  0=no, 1=yes 
‘France’  France (FRA)  0=no, 1=yes 
‘Ireland’  Ireland (IRE)  0=no, 1=yes 
‘Italy’  Italy (ITA)  0=no, 1=yes 
‘Portugal’  Portugal (POR)  0=no, 1=yes 
‘United Kingdom’  United Kingdom (UK)  0=no, 1=yes 
‘The Netherlands’  The Netherlands (NED)  0=no, 1=yes 
‘Nuts 3 regions’     
Abbreviations: LSU = Livestock units. ha = Hektare 
Source: Farm Accountancy Data Network (2001-2004).   17 
Table A2. Parameter estimates of logit models explaining AE program participation (all countries) 
 
Variable  Estimate  Std. Error  Wald Chi
2  (Sign.) 
         
Intercept (PAE=1, Mixed farm, The Netherlands)  -5.091  0.713  50.959  (***) 
         
Area under cultivation  -0.206  0.079  6.824  (***) 
Rented land  0.085  0.029  8.508  (***) 
Permanent pasture  0.036  0.030  1.470   
Grazing livestock units  0.068  0.036  3.670  (*) 
Grazing livestock density  -0.157  0.069  5.206  (**) 
On-farm labour  0.211  0.084  6.275  (*) 
Farm sales  -0.224  0.061  13.748  (***) 
Farm capital (per ha)  0.280  0.075  13.848  (***) 
Pesticide expenditures (per ha)  0.020  0.033  0.348   
Fertilizer expenditures (per ha)  -0.234  0.036  42.934  (***) 
Total subsidies  0.128  0.034  14.105  (***) 
Altitude zone  0.397  0.063  40.050  (***) 
         
Dummy variables         
‘Arable farm’  0.147  0.108  1.856   
‘Dairy farm’  -0.180  0.096  3.514  (*) 
‘Livestock farm’  0.158  0.103  2.364   
‘Pig & poultry farm’  -0.360  0.221  2.663   
‘Germany’  1.495  0.091  267.863  (***) 
‘Spain’  -1.994  0.134  221.776  (***) 
‘France’  0.525  0.090  33.929  (***) 
‘Ireland’  0.077  0.149  0.265   
‘Italy’  -0.654  0.198  10.902  (***) 
‘Portugal’  0.937  0.129  52.610  (***) 
‘United Kingdom’  0.041  0.127  0.103   
         
Number of observations  10.004       
LR chi-squared  1,127.163      (***) 
Pseudo R
2 rescaled  0.209       
         
% Correct predictions  88.74       
Non-Participants  88.17       
Participants  0.57       
Notes: For variable definition see Table A1. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1 per cent (***), 5 per cent 
(**) or 10 per cent (*) level.  
 
 
 
 
 